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Parental Rights and the Habilitation
Decision for Mentally Retarded Children
A child in the United States "is not the mere creature of the State."1
Rather, his upbringing is entrusted to his parents,' who, unless proven
unfit in a formal termination hearing,3 make critical decisions for the
child in such areas as educational services, medical treatment, and social
development. In a variety of circumstances, the power of parents to make
these choices has been granted constitutional protection. In the case of
parents whose mentally retarded4 child receives residential care5 in a state
facility, however, parental authority has been curtailed.
Current federal and state statutes limit the ability of parents to make
decisions concerning the habilitation that their mentally retarded child re-
1. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
2. The Supreme Court first identified the right of parents to control their child's upbringing in
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state law forbidding teaching of any modem language other
than English to elementary school children invades liberty guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment and
exceeds power of state). The Meyer Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guar-
antee of liberty "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children . . . ." Id. at 399 (emphasis added); see also Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (statute requiring all children to attend public schools is uncon-
stitutional interference "with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control"); infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (substantive due
process rights of parents in family life).
3. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (unanimous Court):
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[i]f a State were to
attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their
children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought
to be in the children's best interest."
Id. (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment)); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (all
Illinois parents, including unwed fathers, "constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before
their children are removed from their custody" without parental permission). Parental rights termina-
tion hearings must meet procedural standards. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982)
(Fourteenth Amendment's due process standard requires "clear and convincing evidence" standard of
proof before termination of parental rights).
4. The most widely accepted definition of mental retardation is that of the American Association
on Mental Deficiency (AAMD): "Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intel-
lectual functioning resulting in or associating with impairments in adaptive behavior and manifested
during the developmental period [i.e. prior to age 18]?' D. MACMILLAN, MENTAL RETARDATION IN
SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 41 (2d ed. 1982). For important criticism of this definition, see id. at 44-48
(adaptive behavior cannot be adequately measured at present and AAMD definition said to combine,
in confusing way, medical and statistical model). About three to five percent of the children born each
year in the United States will be found to be mentally retarded. PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: PREVENTION STRATEGIES THAT WORK 3
(1980). More than six million Americans will be identified as mentally retarded at some point in their
lives. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: PAST AND
PRESENT 150-51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PAST AND PRESENT].
5. Residential care can vary from institutional care in a large facility to deinstitutionalized care in
smaller, community-based residences, see infra note 18.
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ceives when that child is in a state institution. Habilitation consists of
education and training for those who are mentally retarded.' This Note
argues that habilitation decisions for mentally retarded children in resi-
dential care are best made by their parents, and not by public employees,
such as mental health workers, as is the current practice. Respecting pa-
rental authority in this area will serve the same societal goals as in the
traditional areas over which parents retain decisionmaking power in rela-
tion to their children. This Note suggests that the current limitations on
parental habilitation decisionmaking are unconstitutional. The Note also
sets forth a standard, supported by current mental health policy, as well
as by current constitutional norms, which ensures that parents have a role
in deciding the treatment their institutionalized child will receive. Parental
authority can be accorded full effect through incorporation in state statutes
of a standard such as the one this Note proposes.
I. CURRENT STATE OF HABILITATION DECISIONMAKING
Legally and medically, habilitation has been broadly defined. Habilita-
tion is the application of professional services to help a mentally retarded
person make maximal use of his capacities so he will function more effec-
tively.7 Retarded persons have a constitutional right to an amount of ha-
bilitation which requires "the State to provide minimally adequate or rea-
sonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint."
Habilitation can include choices among educational options;9 medical
treatments, such as psychotropic drugs;10 and various kinds of behavior
6. For a full definition of habilitation, see infra note 7 and accompanying text.
7. P. ROSEN, M. CLARK & S. Kivrrz, HABILITATION OF THE HANDICAPPED 3 (1977); see also
Katz-Garris, Litigation and Legislative Regulations Impacting on the Treatment of the Developmen-
tally Disabled, in TREATMENT ISSUES AND INNOVATIONS IN MENTAL RETARDATION 104 (J. Mat-
son & F. Andrasik eds. 1983) (habilitation "not only... a skills acquisition or maintenance function
but also... a remedial process") [hereinafter cited as TREATMENT ISSUES].
For legal discussions of habilitation, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 n.1 (1982) (habil-
itation's principal focus is on training and development of needed skills); Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 7 n.2 (1981) (habilitation consists of "education and training for
those, such as the mentally retarded, who are not ill"). Lower federal courts have more closely fol-
lowed the medical definition, which emphasizes the maximization of the retarded person's capabilities.
See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
("'Habilitation' is the term of art used to refer to that education, training and care required by
retarded individuals to reach their maximal development."), affid and modified, 612 F. 2d 84 (3d
Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
8. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
9. An important educational option relates to language development because a retarded person's
progress towards independence is greatly affected by his ability to communicate. Bennett, Reviewing
an Individual Habilitation Plan: A Lawyer's Guide, 4 U. ARK. LrrTL ROCK L.J. 467, 480 (1981).
Decisions relating to language development include whether a retarded child should be taught to
speak or should be trained in alternative methods of communication, such as a language board. Id.
10. Psychotropic drugs are substances used for the express purpose of producing behavioral, emo-
tional, or cognitive changes. Aman, Psychoactive Drugs in Mental Retardation, in TREATMENT Is-
SUES, supra note 7, at 455. Pharmacotherapy is employed with the retarded in the hopes of both
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modification programs."" Elements used in habilitation can be highly con-
troversial. For example, "response contingent electrical stimulation," a
type of behavior modification, involves the brief application of an electri-
cal shock after undesirable behavior.1 2 "Overcorrection," '13 another type of
behavior modification used in habilitation plans, uses "punishment" 4 to
change unwanted behavior.1 5
diminishing "pathological behavior" and encouraging "adaptive behavior." Id. at 456. But psycho-
tropic drugs can provide no qualities that a person does not already possess. See Hollis & St. Olmer,
Direct Measurement of Psychopharmacologic Responses, 76 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 397, 403
(1972) (drugs merely accelerate or decelerate behavior already in subject's repetoire or change
probability of its occurrence).
11. Behavior modification refers to a group of techniques "derived from the models of classical
conditioning, social learning, and operant conditioning, with heavy emphasis on the last." McCarver
& Cavalier, Philosophical Concepts and Attitudes Underlying Programmingfor the Mentally Re-
tarded, in TREATMENT ISsuEs, supra note 7, at 8. Like any other element of a habilitation program,
behavior modification attempts to maximize the potential of the retarded individual. See Bigelow, The
Behavioral Approach to Retardation, in BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED
17-18 (T. Thompson & J. Grabowski eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as BEHAVIOR MODIFI ATION]
("Behavior modification attempts to teach individuals the specific skills they have failed to learn ear-
lier-skills which help them to function more effectively, enjoy wider experiences, and put them in a
position to continue learning other valuable skills."). But see P. RosEN, M. CLARK & S. KpvrI,
supra note 7, at 24 ("[B]ehavior modification techniques often represent radical departures from
traditional habilitation efforts, although the same habilitative goals certainly apply."). i
12. Richmond & Martin, Punishment as a Therapeutic Method with Institutionalized Retarded
Persons, in, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION, supra note 11, at 467, 485. Richmond and Martin note a
number of significant problems with response-contingent electrical stimulation: (1) the use of "punish-
ing electrical stimulas can be dangerous if administered carelessly"; (2) if used inappropriately, the
technique can generate undesirable results; (3) "the need for long-term follow up requires that the
equipment be set aside for a specific resident for months, or even years." Id. at 485-86, 491.
13. Overcorrection "incorporates several basic learning principles: extinction (immediate termina-
tion of the inappropriate behavior and its accompanying reinforcement), timeout (removal of general
reinforcement for a period of at least several minutes), and punishment (instruction and guided prac-
tice in a restitutional or related activity requiring some physical effort)." Roberts, Iwata, McSween &
Desmond, Jr., An Analysis of Overcorrection Movements, 83 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 588
(1979).
Overcorrection, like behavior modification, is controversial. See Foxx, Attention Training: The Use
of Overcorrection Avoidance to Increase the Eye Contact of Autistic and Retarded Children, 10 J.
OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 489, 498 (1977) (ethical considerations arise in studies that use
intrusive procedures such as overcorrection where only aversive consequences are available and no
positive consequences for appropriate behaviors); Matson, Stephens & Smith, Treatment of Self-
Injudicious Behavior with Overcorrection, 22 J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY RESEARCH 175-78 (1978)
(use of overcorrection therapy required profoundly retarded woman to brush her teeth with mixture
of lemon juice and hot sauce because she drank prescribed mouthwash during pretreatment sessions);
Richmond & Martin, supra note 12, at 485 ("severe abuses of overcorrection occur all too often" as
result of "the vague nature of the procedure" and tendency of some staff members to use "excessive
coercive force").
14. In behavior modification, "punishment" is generally defined as an event following a maladap-
tive behavior which will lead to a rapid reduction of the behavior in question. Azrin & Holtz, Punish-
ment, in OPERANT BEHAVIOR 234 (W. Honeg ed. 1966). The punishment element of overcorrection
is also termed "aversive consequences." Ferretti & Cavalier, A Critical Assessment of Overcorrection
Procedures with Mentally Retarded Persons, in TREATMFNT ISSUES, supra note 7, at 241, 243.
15. Richmond & Martin, supra note 12, at 481.
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A. The Problem: Excluding Parents
The extent and seriousness of parent's lack of control over habilitation
decisions are manifest in litigation seeking to deinstitutionalize or improve
the treatment of retarded individuals who receive residential care. The
plaintiffs in these cases have complained at length about the lack of insti-
tutional response to parental requests for modifications in the treatments
of patients."" The lack of institutional response has sometimes led to tragic
results.' 7
This absence of parental control is not remedied by the current deinsti-
tutionalization movement.1" Although deinstitutionalization has helped re-
tarded persons,' 9 it alone will not solve all the problems associated with
the treatment of retarded children, and parents of a retarded child may
still be denied the power to make habilitation decisions when the child is
placed in a small residential setting rather than a larger institution.20 In-
16. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 5-6, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (mother
repeatedly attempts to influence son's treatment program without avail before seeking to improve his
care by filing civil rights suit against officials of institution); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171
(D.N.H. 1981) (parents of retarded children institutionalized in state school sue school because of
deficiencies in school's education and training and its lack of habilitation plans); Philipp v. Carey, 517
F. Supp. 513 (1981) (parents and relatives of mentally retarded citizens confined at state-owned facil-
ity in Syracuse, N.Y. contest inappropriate programs and services); Complaint at 4, Connecticut Ass'n
for Retarded Citizens v. Mansfield Training School, Civ. No. H78-653 (D. Conn. Dec. 12, 1983)
(parent's protest over lack of programs or therapy for institutionalized child said to lead to physical
abuse of child by staff); see also D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 42-43
(1984) (parents protest conditions at New York institution for mentally retarded individuals, para-
phrase Robert Kennedy's comment about institution: "[A]nimals in the Staten Island Zoo have more
space and get better care than the children at Willowbrook").
17. See, e.g., Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610, 613-14 (D.R.I. 1978), affld, 605 F.2d
586 (1st Cir. 1979) (parents of retarded child communicated child's sensitivity to phenothiazane, a
major tranquilizer, but drug was administered anyway, possibly in "a calculated effort" to control
behavior of child, causing convulsive spasms and hemorrhaging).
18. Deinstitutionalization is the important trend away from placing or maintaining retarded per-
sons in large institutions in favor of a multi-faceted community-based system, which allows retarded
persons to be served by programs and in residences in as normal a way as possible. V. BRADLEY,
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 5 (1978). This trend began
in the late 1960's. Butterfield, Some Basic Changes in Residential Facilities, in CHANGING PAT-
TERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 15 (R. Kugel & A. Shearer eds.
1976) [hereinafter cited as CHANGING PATTERNS].
Deinstitutionalized residential care is commonly provided in various kinds of community-based ar-
rangements, which include community residences and intermediate care facilities. Society for Good
Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1338 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). In a community
residence, which is often a single family dwelling with four to fourteen clients, clients are supervised
either by live-in house parents or by a rotating staff. Id. The intermediate care facility is similar to a
community residence, but provides greater supervision for clients with more substantial medical and
behavioral needs. Id.
19. See PAST AND PRESENT, supra note 4, at 130 (main thrust of deinstitutionalization not just to
move retarded people out of institutions but to provide quality alternatives to institutions). Deinstitu-
tionalization may also help minimize the problems of stigma and isolation faced by mentally retarded
persons. V. BRADLEY, supra note 18, at 5.
20. A survey of group homes of varying sizes found that "institution-oriented management pat-
terns prevailed. . . regardless of the size of the facility." S. BERcovicI, BARRIERS TO NORMALIZA-
TION: THE RESTRICTVE MANAGEMENT OF RETARDED PERSONS 141 (1983). Other problems were
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deed, deinstitutionalization may create some new difficulties and dangers"
that make necessary continuing parental decisionmaking.
B. Current Law Regarding Habilitation Decisions
Federal and state laws currently employ a variety of legal standards,
some of which are not entirely clear in intent or meaning, to assign deci-
sionmaking power over the habilitation of retarded children in state
institutions.
1. Federal Law: The DDA
Many of the federal statutes that help handicapped persons also assist
the mentally retarded.22 Of these, one suggests the imposition of a legal
burden on states to consult with parents in making habilitation decisions:
The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
(DDA).2" State facilities accepting financial allocations under the DDA
must meet its standards relating to the services that people with develop-
mental disabilities receive.
24
The DDA gives parents "where appropriate" a role in developing the
individual habilitation plan (IHP), which is required for each mentally
retarded individual in a state facility.25 The legislative history of the DDA
found in the group homes included in this survey: (1) small group homes, despite prior expectations,
were more custodial in some ways than the larger facilities; (2) certain features of the group homes
"reinforce thinking and behavior on the part of the retarded individual that are not adaptive when the
individual is in noninstitutional settings"; (3) the general quality of the environment at the facilities
varied widely; (4) the program goals and methods of the majority of the facilities "could only be seen
as adhering to an implicit corrective-detentive model which, by its nature, is non-normalizing"; (5) an
"institution-oriented practice of depersonalization" occured to some degree at all the facilities. Id. at
141-45.
21. See V. BRADLEY, supra note 18, at 10 ("In their haste to decentralize the system of care for
developmentally disabled persons by shifting the emphasis away from large, state-run programs, some
states have lost their ability to ensure adequate accountability for the well-being of those receiving
care."); cf. Cruickshank, Foreword, in DEINSTMrTIONALIZATION vii Ui. Paul, D. Stedman & G.
Neufeld eds. 1977) ("No social movement has been inititiated with such abruptness or so little plan-
ning as has been deinstitutionalization.").
22. For example, 400,000 retarded people receive Supplemental Security Income and 250,000
receive Social Security payments under 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d), 403 (1982). Turnball, Rightsfor Devel-
opmentally Disabled Citizens, 4 U. ARK. LrrrLE RocK L.J. 400, 414 n.54 (1981). Between 1979
and 1981, approximately 1,250 retarded people received Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment loans to help them live in group homes or small apartment complexes. Id. at 414.
23. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92
Stat. 3004 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1982)); see also infra note 52 (discussing
Education for Handicapped Children Act).
24. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6012(a) (for state to receive federal allotment under DDA, it must have
in place "a system to protect and advocate the rights of persons with developmental disabilities"); 42
U.S.C. § 6063 (any state desiring to take advantage of funds available under DDA must have detailed
state plan providing for fiscal administrative procedures approved by Secretary of Health and Human
Services).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 6011(b) (1982) states:
A habilitation plan for a person with developmental disabilities shall meet the following
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is silent as to the extent to which it is "appropriate" for states to give
parents this role,2" and no cases have examined the language of this sec-
tion of the Act.2 7 The DDA's failure to specify the weight that is to be
assigned to parental wishes is matched by its neglect to establish proce-
dures for appealing habilitation decisions.2 8 The language of the DDA is
vague enough to leave parental involvement entirely to a state's discre-
tion."9 The language is also broad enough, however, to be consistent with
the standard advocated in this Note.30
2. State Law
State statutes do not permit adequate parental involvement in the deter-
mination of their institutionalized child's habilitation. The largest group
of state statutes fail to require any habilitation plan for the mentally re-
tarded clients of their institutions."' The next largest group of states,
requirements:
(1) The plan shall be in writing.
(2) The plan shall be developed jointly by (A) a representative or representatives of the pro-
gram primarily responsible for delivering or coordinating the delivery of services to the person
for whom the plan is established, (B) such person, and (c) [sic] where appropriate, such per-
son's parents or guardian or other representative.
(emphasis added). Regulations issued by the Office of Human Development, Department of Health
and Human Services, require that each state receiving funds under the DDA meet "the requirements
regarding individual habilitation plans" set forth in 42 U.S.C. 6011. 45 C.F.R. § 1386 (1984).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-44, H.R. REP. No. 1188, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-113, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7312-24; H.R. REs'. No. 58, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-44, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 919-64.
27. While no cases give a substantive dimension to this role, there have been important judicial
decisions relating to the DDA. In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981),
the Supreme Court examined the bill of rights provision of the DDA, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1982), and
concluded that nothing in the Act or its legislative history suggested that Congress intended to require
the states to provide "appropriate treatment" for mentally retarded citizens in the "least restrictive
environment." The Court contrasted the Bill of Rights section, which expressed congressional prefer-
ence, with sections that were conditions for the receipt of federal funding, such as § 6011. Id. at 13.
See Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 195-205 (D.N.H. 1981) (DDA grants to residents of state
school limited private right of action against Secretary of Health and Human Health Services to force
performance of duties imposed by this Act); Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center v. Melton,
521 F. Supp. 365, 369 (D.N.H. 1981) (legal services organization established pursuant to DDA, 42
U.S.C § 6012, and counsel who purported to represent mentally retarded residents of state school
lacked standing to challenge visitation regulations).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 6011 (1982).
29. All a state has to do is decide that it is not "appropriate" to involve parents in the develop-
ment of their child's IHP.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-52-50 to -52-58 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1002.1 to -1009
(1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5501 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-11-1 (1981); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 33(E) (1980 Supp. & 1976); IowA CODE ANN. § 222 (West 1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
65-4401 to 4408 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:380 (West Supp. 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
111, § 70(E) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-9 (1983 Supp. & 1981); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 633.025, .130 (Vernon Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-2, 168-8 (1976); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 435 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 23-6-1 (1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4423
(Purdon 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-22-2 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-21-10 (Law. Co-op.
1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-8-13 (1953); VA. CODE § 37.1-84.1 (1984); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
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while requiring habilitation plans, fail to specify any need for a parental
role in their development. 32 State statutes that do mention a general need
for consulting with parents,"3 or for giving them some kind of opportunity
§ 71.20 (1975); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 51.47 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
32. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 27.10.5-113(1) (1982) ("Each resident shall have an individualized
treatment plan formulated" and "reviewed semiannually" by "professional persons."); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 37-4-2(9), -4-20, -4-122 (1982) (parent of minor child may apply to have child examined by
"comprehensive evaluation team," and if majority of team concludes child needs "specialized services
other than that which he is then receiving," team will recommend individual program plan for child);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-1.6-7 (Bums 1983) ("All patients or clients are entitled to be informed of
the nature of the treatment or habilitation program proposed"; adult clients may refuse to submit to
program and involuntary patient may petition court or hearing officer for consideration of program;
"In the absence of such petition, the service provider may proceed with the proposed treatment or
habilitation program."); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2147(2)(A) (1978) (every client served by
department of mental retardation shall have "habilitation program"); MD. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 7-
605 (1982) ("The professional and supportive staff of a residential State facility shall make a written
plan of treatment . . . ."); MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.1712 (West 1980) ("An individualized
written plan of services shall be developed for each resident and shall be kept current and shall be
modified when indicated."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253 B.03(7) (West 1982) ("The treatment facility
shall devise a written program plan for each person which describes in behavioral terms the case
problems, the precise goals, including the expected period of time for treatment, and the specific
measures to be employed" and which "shall be devised and reviewed with the designated agency and
the patient"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-20-148(4) (1983) ("Each resident has a right to a habilitation
program. . . ."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25.01.2-14 (1983 Supp.) ("Any institution, facility, agency or
organization that provides services for developmentally disabled persons shall have a written, individ-
ual habilitation plan developed and put into effect for each person. . . ."); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
171-A:12 (1977 & Supp. 1983) ("There shall be an individual service plan for every client in the
service delivery system" which shall be developed under "the supervision of the administrator" and
reviewed continually); Oo REv. CODE ANN. § 5123.85(B) (Page 1981) ("All . . . residents shall
have a written habilitation plan . . ... "); OKLA. STAT, ANN. tit. 43A, § 622 (West Supp.
1984)("[A]n individualized treatment plan. . . shall be specifically tailored to [each] person's treat-
ment needs."); OR. REv. STAT. § 427.020 (1981) (each resident of state training center for mentally
retarded persons required to have "plan of care" that includes "current diagnosis . . .; [clurrent ha-
bilitation and health programs in which the resident is participating . . .; [sitatement of long-term
and short-term goals for the resident . . ."); S.D. CoDiF.D LAws ANN. §§ 27B-8-10, -11
(1984)("[Qualified developmental disabilities professional" shall "[flormulate an individual habilita-
tion plan" for each resident); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-520, -521 (1977) ("From the time a mentally
retarded person or delinquent is received in a program . . . he shall be under the exclusive care,
custody, and control of the director," and shall receive "an individualized program of training."); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8835 (1984) ("[F]or each mentally retarded person placed in a residential
facility established by the commissioner,. . . a current individual program plan" will be maintained);
W. VA. CODE § 27-5-9 (1980) ("The chief medical officer shall cause to be developed within the
clinical record of each patient a written treatment plan . . ... "); Wyo. STAT. §§ 25-5-102, -116
(1982) ("Each resident. . . shall have on file. . . an individual program plan" that will be reviewed
at least annually by an interdisciplinary team of which parent is member).
33. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.065(2) (West 1983) ("The parent or guardian of the client. . . shall
be consulted in the development of the plan" and in annual revision of plan); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
30:6D-10 (West 1981) (individualized habilitation plan "shall be developed and may be revised from
time to time. . . in consultation" with client and parents).
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for participation, 4 leave it to state employees to decide when and how
parents should be involved.35
The Connecticut statute, for example, contains broad language that re-
quires the attending physician of any institutionalized child to obtain "in-
formed consent" from the parents of any unemancipated resident under
eighteen years of age before "any medical treatment."36 The practice in
this state, however, is to obtain parental consent only when life-
threatening medical treatments are to be performed on institutionalized
children.17 Thus, in Connecticut as in other states, the extent of a parent's
right to control treatment decisions is limited.3" Under state law, a par-
34. ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.551.01(J) (1983) ("Each client who has been accepted to receive
developmental disability services shall have the right to receive a written individual program plan"
that "shall be developed by appropriate department personnel with the participation of the client, his
parents, and his guardian, if any . . . ."); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4646 (West 1984) (The
"individual progam plan" that "may be developed for any person who. . . is found to be eligible for,
and in need of, such plan" is to be "prepared jointly by one or more representatives of the regional
center, the developmentally disabled person, and where appropriate, the person's parents . . .");
IDAHO CODE § 66-431(2) (1983) ("Each facility shall take reasonable efforts to include the resident
or client and parents of minor residents or clients . . . in the development of the [individual treat-
ment] plan."); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 4-309, Mental Health & Dev. Disab. Code § 4-309 (1982)
("Every reasonable effort shall be made to involve the client and his family in the preparation and
implementation of the [habilitation] plan."); Ky. REV. STAT. § 202B.060(1), (2) (1982) (mentally
retarded residents and their families have right to be "adequately informed as to the individual treat-
ment program of the resident" and "to assist" in its planning); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-661 (1984)
(habilitation plan not required, but parents given right "to initiate a hearing on matters relating to the
initiation, change, or termination or the refusal to initiate, change, or terminate the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of a [handicapped] child"); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §
29.13(b) (1979) (In causing "written treatment plan" to be prepared or revised, "the patient or an
authorized representative, to include the parent or parents if the patient is a minor, shall be inter-
viewed and provided an opportunity to actively participate in such preparation or revision.").
35. The language of the statutes that do specify a need for some kind of parental involvement
provide an easy escape for the state official who does not want to involve any given parent-he need
only decide that it is not "appropriate" to involve them or that he can not do so with any "reasonable
effort." And, of course, these statutes leave the extent of participation by parents to the discretion of
the official. Cf. Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center. v. Melton, 521 F. Supp. 365, 368 n.3
(D.N.H. 1981) (staff members who feel "best interests" of resident warrant overturning of guardian's
refusal to agree to placement decision do so).
36. CONN. GEN. STAT. §19(a)-469(f) (1983) states:
The commissioner of mental retardation shall require the attending physician of any person
placed or treated under his direction to obtain informed written consent from the following
persons prior to authorizing any surgical procedure or any medical treatment, excluding rou-
tine medical treatment which is necessary to maintain the general health of a resident or to
prevent the spread of any communicable disease: (1) The resident if he is eighteen years of age
or over or is legally emancipated and competent to give such consent; (2) the parent of a
resident under eighteen years of age who is not legally emancipated; or (3) the legal guardian
or conservator of a resident of any age who is adjudicated unable to make informed decisions
about matters relating to his medical care.
37. Conversation with George Doyle, Director of Social Services, New Haven Regional Center,
Department of Mental Retardation for the State of Conn., Apr. 12, 1984. Connecticut has, however,
granted the parents of mentally retarded residents of the Mansfield Training School, a large institu-
tion for the mentally retarded, "a primary role" in the placement decisionmaking process following a
consent decree to reduce the population of the clients at this school. Consent Decree, Connecticut
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Thorne, Civil No. H-78-6534 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 1983).
38. The exception to this general pattern may be Texas. See Tx. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300
(§ 18) (Vernon 1982) ("Whenever possible, the client or the parent of a minor. . . . shall be given
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ent's wishes for his child have less weight than those of the state employ-
ees who are assigned to the child's treatment team. These employees, by
having the discretion to decide the scope of parental involvement, have the
power to decide the habilitation that an institutionalized mentally retarded
child will receive.
C. A Narrower Definition of Habilitation
In order to set clear limits on the scope of authority of both the state
and the parents, this Note narrows the general definition of habilitation.
The proposed definition sets an age limit for those on whose behalf habili-
tation decisions are made and excludes certain kinds of decisions from the
ambit of habilitation plans, which set long-term goals and short-term
objectives for the child. 9
Parental habilitation power should be restricted to choices made on be-
half of children who are legal minors. When a mentally retarded individ-
ual reaches the age of majority, there should be a hearing at which par-
ents, if they choose, can petition to continue as their son's or daughter's
legal guardian.4 °
Although "health" is an "ambiguous state about which doctors and pa-
-tients may have conflicting expectations,"4 routine minor health care de-
mands no more than those noncontroversial procedures performed rou-
tinely to maintain a general level of physical well-being."2 A decision to
treat a minor cut with antiseptic and an adhesive bandage, for example,
does not belong within the scope of an individual habilitation plan. At the
other extreme, but also excluded by this narrowing of habilitation, are
emergency situations involving non-terminally ill children."' In this type
of situation, when obtaining parental permission would take time during
which the child's life might be seriously impaired, on-the-spot medical
the opportunity to decide among several appropriate alternative services available to the client
... "). But see Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 98 F.R.D. 11, 12 (E.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 710 F.2d
1040 (5th Cir. 1983) (class action suit challenges adequacy of conditions, care, and habilitation at
Texas institutions for mentally retarded individuals).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 6011(b)(3) (1982) ("The plan shall contain a statement of the long-term
habilitation goals for the person and the intermediate habilitation objectives relating to the attainment
of such goals.").
40. Applicable guardianship provisions are already found in state codes, see, e.g., IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 639.634 to .682 (West 1950).
41. J. KATZ, THE SILEr WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 98 (1984).
42. These routine procedures carry no more than minor risks which, "if they materialize will not
cause the patient substantial harm, pain, or discomfort." Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to
Medical Decisionmaking: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PrrT. L. REV. 407, 432 (1980).
43. An emergency exception applies when immediate treatment is needed to preserve life or pre-
vent a serious impairment to health, and consent cannot be obtained from the parent. See Meisel, The
"Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in
Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wisc. L. REv. 413 (defining emergency exception to informed consent
doctrine).
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personnel need the authority to act promptly." Habilitation decisions
should also be defined so as to disallow the choice of procedures that are
not generally accepted medically.45 The state, while sometimes unable to
interfere with these procedures in other circumstances,'4 is not obliged to
be the instrument by which they are delivered.
Finally, parental control over non-emergency life and death decisions
raises different questions than parental control over a habilitation plan.4
7
As such, these decisions require a different framework than does
habilitation.' 8
II. HABILITATION DECISIONMAKING BY PARENTS
Habilitation decisionmaking includes choices in three areas over which
parents are normally granted control: a child's education,'49 medical treat-
ment, 50 and social development."1 Habilitation decisions have educational
44. For example, cardiac arrest usually has a fatal outcome for an injured child. Morse, Evalua-
tion and Initial Management, in PEDIATRIC TRAUMA 30 (R. Touloukian ed. 1978).
45. See PREsIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: REPORT 3 (1982)
(hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE] ("Patients
are not entitled to insist that health care practitioners furnish them services when to do so would
violate . . . the bounds of acceptable practice.").
46. See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(simple electrical instruments, dubbed E-meters or Hubbard Electrometers, used in process said to
improve spiritual and bodily condition cannot be banned by government because of unopposed case
that religious belief involved); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1964) (native Americans' use of peyote in mystical religious ceremony can not be banned by state
statute).
47. Gaylin, Who Speaks for the Child?, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD 5 (W. Gaylin and R.
Macdin eds. 1982) ("Our society places a high value on human life, and we tend to be repelled by
the thought of granting any third party, even a parent, the power of life and death.").
48. Compare In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976) (father of severely brain-damaged woman could exercise daughter's right to privacy
against bodily intrusion by authorizing removal of artificial life support only upon mandatory involve-
ment of family, attending doctor, and hospital ethics committee); Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 757-59, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434-35 (1977) (probate court, not
hospital ethics committee, has responsibility to determine whether to administer potentially life-
prolonging treatment to terminally ill, mentally incompetent resident of state institution); Note, A
Structural Analysis of the Physician-Patient Relationship in No-Code Decisionmaking, 93 YALE L.J.
362, 381 n.111 (1983) (if dying child's life "would only be prolonged for a short time during which a
normal quality of life would be impossible," parents can give "informed consent" to no-coding, which
orders nursing staff not to summon resuscitation team if patient has cardio-pulmonary arrest).
49. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (state has no general power to force
children to accept instruction in public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ("[It
is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life."). But
recent Supreme Court cases allow great deference to state officials. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 670 (1977) (parents sue on behalf of children punished by disciplinary paddling, but public
school teachers allowed to inflict "such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary for the proper
education and discipline of the child"); infra text accompanying notes 116-20.
50. See generally Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("Simply because the decision of a
parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power
to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state.").
51. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents have interest in raising children
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elements because they involve choices among types of academic and voca-
tional training for the child.52 They contain medical elements because they
utilize medical science to help maximize a child's potential. 3 Finally,
these decisions relate to a child's social development because they include
training in such areas as the use of leisure time and the ability to interact
socially in an appropriate manner."
For the same reasons parents control a child's education, medical treat-
ment, and socialization, they should make habilitation decisions. Parents
make child-rearing decisions because of (a) their own unique qualifica-
tions to do so; (b) the state's incapacity to make these sensitive decisions;
and (c) the stake our society has in diversity, which prevents the state
from standardizing its citizens.
in Amish religion and way of life); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (state may not
"foster a homogenous people with American ideals" by banning instruction in any modern language
other than English).
52. See Bennett, supra note 9, at 481 ("A school age developmentally disabled client should be
enrolled in a fully certified special education program."). Children in special education programs are
required by the Education for Handicapped Children Act (EHCA), 20 U.S.C. § 1401(2)(1) (1977),
to have an Individual Education Plan. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1977) ("[I]ndividualized education
program" is "a written statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a represen-
tative of the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit. .. , the teacher, the parents
or guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child . -").
The EHCA grants parents the right "to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to
the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appro-
priate public education to such child." id. § 1415(2)(b)(1)(E) (1977). It also sets up a detailed proce-
dure for hearing complaints. Parents have "an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing
which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency or by the
local educational agency or intermediate educational unit." Id. § 1415(b)(2). Appeal from findings
and decisions rendered in this hearing can be made to the State educational agency which is obligated
to "conduct an impartial review" of the hearing. Id. § 1415(c). Appeal from the decision of the state
educational agency can be made by bringing a civil action in any state court of competent jurisdiction
or in a federal district court. Id. § 1415(e)(2).
The EHCA does not, however, specify the weight parental wishes are to be given. See SEN. REP.
No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1435
("[T]he Committee intends to ensure adequate involvement of the parents or guardian of the handi-
capped child . . . in both the statement and its subsequent review and revision."). Courts have not
consistently decided where to place the burden of proof when IEP's are questioned. Compare Tatro v.
Texas, 703 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1983), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Irving Indepen-
dent School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984) (fairness requires that party attacking terms of
IEP bear burden of showing why educational setting is not appropriate) and Bales v. Clarke, 523 F.
Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981) (handicapped child has burden of establishing that regional school was
inappropriate for her needs) with Davis v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 1209
(D.D.C. 1982) (school district has burden of showing that its proposal is indeed "an appropriate
one").
53. For controversial medical elements of a habilitation plan, see supra text accompanying notes
10-15.
54. Bennett, supra note 9, at 483.
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A. Parents' Qualifications to Protect the Child's Best Interests
While the interests of parents and children may sometimes conflict,55
our society generally allows, indeed expects, parents to assume responsi-
bility for their children."6 Parents are expected to evaluate and make judg-
ments about the needs and requests of their children. This responsibility is
theirs because most child rearing decisions require the knowledge of par-
ents, rather than the professional expertise of specialists,5  and because the
natural bonds of affection generally lead parents to act in the best interests
of the child.58 Indeed, this bond between parent and child is of profound
importance to the emotional life of both.59 Our legal system enforces the
societal assumption that parents should make child rearing decisions by
granting parents the freedom to do so unless they are shown unfit and are
disqualified at a formal proceeding comporting with due process
requirements.60
The mental condition or living situation of the retarded child in resi-
dential care does not render his parents unfit to protect the child's best
interests. Suspicion of these parents appears to follow from their decision
55. The Supreme Court's decisions regarding a minor child's decision to have an abortion reflect
an understanding that the interests of parents and child sometimes conflict. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion) (privacy right of mature child requires that if state requires
pregnant minor to obtain parental consent for abortion, it must also provide alternative procedure for
abortion authorization); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976)
(state does not have constitutional authority to give parent absolute veto over minor's abortion deci-
sion); see also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 691-96 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(state prohibition of nonprescription contraceptives to those under sixteen years of age struck down
because of minors' privacy right).
56. "Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a
unit with broad parental authority over minor children." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
57. See, e.g., M. JABLOW, CARA: GROWING WITH A RETARDED CHILD (1982) (memoir of life
with retarded daughter emphasizes need for parent to evaluate and monitor school and physical ther-
apy programs).
58. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("[H]istorically [the law] has recognized that
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.") (citations omit-
ted); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children."). Kent
begins his chapter "Of Parent and Child" with mention of "those feelings of parental love ... which
Providence has implanted in the human breast." 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
189 (J. Gould 12th ed. 1896); see also J. JoYcE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN
241-42 (1916) (Cranly advises Stephen Dedalus, "Whatever else is unsure in this stinking dunghill of
a world a mother's love is not.").
59. See Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("the parent's achievement of
a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of
his offspring" and "[a] child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the relationship
derives from the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsive, reliable adult")
(footnotes omitted); B. RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS 123-24 (1959) ("The family is important
at the present day more through the emotions with which it provides parents than for any other
reason.").
60. See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 632
(1976) (unless parental rights have been terminated, even parents whose children have been removed
from their care because of neglect retain some rights concerning the child).
1726
Parental Rights
to institutionalize their child,"1 but this decision is unrelated to any ability
or inability to make habilitation choices. Parents often have no other
choice than to turn to the state for assistance because of the substantial
problems associated with keeping or caring for some retarded children at
home.62 Often they are forced to seek residential care for their child be-
cause of an unavailability of those community-based services which would
allow the child to remain at home.6" The numerous lawsuits by parents
seeking to improve their child's treatment in a state facility attest to the
continuance of parental concern."
B. The State's Weaknesses as Decisionmaker
Parental choices require a sensitivity which the state, as an impersonal
institution, cannot have.65 Even well-intentioned social workers do not
have to live with their decisions in the way parents do.66 Furthermore,
61. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("There may be a fundamental conflict of interest between a parent who is ready to
avoid the responsibility of caring for an abnormal child, and the best interests of the child."); Mur- -
dock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 142
(1972) (institutionalizing mentally retarded child allows parents to "'distance themselves' from him
and to deal with the situation in 'an abstract manner").
62. Caring for a mentally retarded individual is exorbitantly expensive. See PAST AND PRESENT,
supra note 4, at 245 ("In current economic values, each severely or profoundly retarded child who
survives birth represents a potential economic liability of nearly a million dollars in combined costs of
lifetime care and loss of normal lifetime productivity."); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
309 n.2 (1982) (after death of father, mother unable to handle severely retarded son who sometimes
becomes violent and requires twenty-four hour care); Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v.
Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (Weinstein, C.J.), vacated, 737 F.2d 1253, 737
F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984):
Mothers and fathers, after courageous struggles to care for their offspring at home, over-
whelmed by lack of respite and assistance, felt compelled to turn ... to the state. They acted
reluctantly in order to save a modicum of sane living for their families and because they be-
lieved the state could do more for their deprived youngsters than they could.
See also Luna, A Perspective, in CHANGING PATTERNS, supra note 18, at 83, 84 (great amount of
attention mother has to pay to her microcephalic child caused her and her other three children such
emotional problems that she saw herself "on the edge of going berserk" and turned to state for
assistance).
63. See, e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. at 1337 (N.Y.
State provides almost no funds to maintain clients in their own homes; parents testify "that they felt
compelled to institutionalize their children or siblings because no community service or programs were
available that would permit them to remain at home").
64. See supra note 16.
65. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (opinion of Powell, J.) (parental role in
guiding children to become responsible adults "in large part, is beyond the competence of impersonal
political institutions"); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 12 (1979) ("[T]he state is too crude an instrument to become an adequate substitute for
flesh and blood parents"); see also Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk, 86 YALE L.J. 645,
650 (1977) (policy of minimum state intervention in family is supported by state's inability to respond
to child's ever-changing needs and its incapacity to deal on individual basis with consequences of its
decisions).
66. See Gaylin, In the Beginning: Helpless and Dependent, in DOING GOOD 28 (W. Gaylin, I.
Glasser, S. Marcus & D. Rothman eds. 1978):
No social institution, regardless of how benevolent or paternalistic, can ever replicate the par-
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technical issues are only one of the factors which impinge upon habilita-
tion decisionmaking.6" Habilitation choices must be based, in part, upon
an individual's ethical, social or religious values.6" Finally, decisionmaking
authority must be granted to parents to avoid the great potential for "dis-
cretionary injustice" 9 that exists when state officials, unchecked by
outside review, choose among possible courses of action or inaction. 0
C. Diversity Among Citizens
Although Plato suggested communal child rearing for his Ideal Com-
monwealth and ancient Sparta entrusted its males to official guardians,"1
these ideas about the relation between individual and state are "wholly
different from those upon which our institutions rest. '72 In America, the
state cannot standardize its children.73 Our society rests not on the "deep
paternalism" of Plato or ancient Sparta but on a "liberal paternalism"
that grants parents a general right to raise their children as they see fit.""
Parents are granted this freedom to protect the pluralism upon which de-
mocracy depends.
7 5
ent-to-child symbiosis. While individuals within institutions-nurses, attendants, physicians,
and the like-may demonstrably exercise affection, tenderness, caring, even love, the power of
authority is vested for the most part within the abstract concept of "the institution," and the
intuitive responses of biology undergo strange transmutations in the structural organizations of
bureaucracies.
67. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE, supra note 45, at 34
(alternatives in health care "vary markedly in their prospects for success, their intrusiveness, their
potential side effects, and their other implications. . . . A determination of what is 'indicated' is thus
inextricably intertwined with the needs and values of the particular patient.").
68. See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 664 ("[T]he law must recognize that it cannot find in
medicine (or for that matter in any science) the ethical, political, or social values for evaluating health-
care choices.").
69. "Discretionary injustice" is a term Kenneth Culp Davis coined. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 218, 219 (2d ed. 1975) ("A public officer has discretion whenever the
effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or
inaction.").
70. Kenneth Davis writes that minimizing discretionary injustice is "the strongest need and the
greatest promise for improving the quality of justice to individual parties in our entire legal and
governmental system." Id. Giving habilitation decisionmaking power to state officials is an example of
what Davis terms "unnecessary discretionary power," id., because this authority should rest with
parents.
71. See PLATO, THE REPuBLC V 458 (P. Shorey trans. 1930) (The lawgiver will pick men and
women who will "have houses and meals in common, and no private possessions... and [who will be]
commingled in gymnastics and in all their life and education"); E. DAVID, SPARTA BETWEEN EM-
PIRE AND REVOLUTION 60 (1981) (Plato admired Spartan educational methods, which influenced his
writings, but he found them narrow "with respect to moral and intellectual values."); see also Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1925) (Platonic and Spartan child rearing discussed).
72. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 402.
73. See supra note 51.
74. See Richards, The Individual, the Family and the Constitution, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15
(1980) ("The concept that separates liberal from deep paternalism is the concept of human rights, the
idea of intrinsic limits on the degree to which one person may control the life of another even for
benevolent motives.").
75. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruTONAL LAW § 16-12, at 1011 (1978) (certain
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Since retarded children are as a general rule capable of development, it
must be left to their parents to shape their formation.7 ' To do otherwise
would give the state the power to standardize this group of our republic's
citizens.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Parental rights are protected by substantive due process.7 7 State in-
fringement of a parent's due process rights is permitted only when the
state's interest both outweighs the parent's rights and where there is a
close correspondence between the state's interest and the actual means that
the state employs.7 1 Unlike equal protection analysis, which involves a
rigid tier system,"' due process balancing involves a "flexible" approach.80
decisions "ought to be placed beyond government's reach. . . because, in government's hands, control
over those choices would pose too great a danger of majoritarian oppression or enduring
subjugation").
76. The Supreme Court has recently stated, in dictum, "[P]rofessionals in the habilitation of the
mentally retarded disagree strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 n.20 (1982) (em-
phasis added) (citing as sole support three articles from 1 ANALYSIS AND INTERVENTION IN DEVEL-
OPMENTAL DISABILIIFS (1981)). "Effective training" does not receive any definition in the Court's
opinion, and it is not a term commonly used by professionals who treat mentally retarded individuals.
In habilitation, an attempt is made to maximize individual capabilities, and there is professional
agreement that all retarded individuals are capable of development. See T. JORDAN, THE MENTALLY
RETARDED 127 (4th ed. 1976) ("[R]etarded youngsters, like all young people, develop as a result of
the way they are raised."); Roos, Misinterpreting Criticisms of the Medical Model, in 2 MENTAL
RETARDATION 22, 23 (1971) ("[AIIl retardates have potential for growth, learning, and develop-
ment."); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 717 (E.D.N.Y.
1975) ("[Rletarded persons, regardless of the degree of handicapping conditions, are capable of physi-
cal, intellectual, emotional, and social growth . . ... ") (quoting proposed consent judgment); ef. P.
INGALLS, MENTAL RETARDATION: THE CHANGING OUTLOOK 389 (1978) ("The fastest growing
area of special education today is the area of special training for children with IQs below 50 [i.e. the
severely or profoundly retarded].").
77. Substantive due process is the "doctrine that governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or
property are subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed . .. ."
Developments in the Law-The Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1166 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Developments-The Family]. While the Supreme Court no longer uses a substantive due process
analysis to protect economic rights, see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938) (in most cases, law must be upheld unless facts "preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislature"), it continues to find
certain family values "fundamental" and thus subject to heightened judicial scrutiny upon state intru-
sions. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (right to marry is fundamental interest
and statute that precludes parent who failed to comply with child support orders from marrying
without court permission is subject to heightened scrutiny); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965) (marital privacy is "a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system" and thus deserves heightened protection from state
interference).
78. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 388 ("When a statutory classification significantly inter-
feres with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by suffi-
ciently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (due process clause requires that "even though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved").
79. This rigid tier system has, however, become flexible enough to permit semi-suspect classifica-
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Although courts utilize ready-made tests in examining challenged state
procedures tinder due process claims,"' no exact threshold divides the most
minimal and the most exacting due process standards. Courts are sup-
posed to weigh the balance of the interests involved.82
The constitutional rights at stake in habilitation decisions are found in
the interplay of three interests. First, there is the usual authority parents
have over their children. Second, the retarded child has an individual lib-
erty interest. Finally, the state has interests in the family and in managing
its institutions. In deciding the nature of the interests involved in habilita-
tion decisionmaking, courts must individually examine and balance them.
A. The Parents' Rights in the Family
Although the rights of parenthood are not without limits, the Supreme
Court has declared that there is a "private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter." 8 Within this realm, the boundaries of which have
been neither consistently located nor firmly fixed," parents are protected
tions and intermediate review. See L. TRIBE, supra note 75, §§ 16-29, 16-31 (discussing semi-suspect
classifications and identifying circumstances that trigger intermediate review).
80. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so often by this Court
and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible."); cf. Poe v. Ullmann,
367 U.S. 497, 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1961) ("Due process has not been reduced to any
formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code."); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (due process hearing must be "appropriate to the nature
of the case").
81. The most popular of these tests was formulated in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976) (assuming existence of interest that deserves protection, three factors must be balanced: (1)
private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used and probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3)
government's interest, including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens entailed by
additional or substitute procedures). See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-613 (1979) (application
of Matthews v. Eldridge test); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 848-56 (1977) (same).
82. See supra note 80; Developments-The Family, supra note 77, at 1197 (rather than create
"arbitrary tests," Court should weigh demands of state and individual liberty interests on case-by-case
basis).
83. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The Court has alluded, often in strong
terms, to the strength of parents' interest in their children. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and man-
agement of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have
lost temporary custody of their child to the State."); Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452
U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (It is now "plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent's desire for
and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children' is an impor-
tant interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, pro-
tection."') (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
84. It is difficult to discover a consistent methodology behind the Supreme Court's decisions to
place some parental activities within the protected realm and other activities outside of it. Compare
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state law requiring formal education after eighth grade
invalid as applied because it would gravely hinder interest of Amish parents in raising their children
in Amish religion and way of life), with Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (although
practice of Jehovah's Witness religion involves public distribution of religious literature, state can
prohibit children raised in this religion from engaging in activity). Either one of these cases can easily
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from state authority in making many decisions relating to family life. 5
Among the personal rights the Supreme Court has deemed "'fundamental'
or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"' there is "some extension"
to child rearing.88
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family, according to the
Supreme Court, "precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. 1 7 When a retarded child is
placed for care in an institution, however, he has been removed from the
structure of the traditional nuclear family-a decision that raises novel
constitutional questions. Fortunately, other nontraditional family arrange-
ments have received judicial examination. For example, some "families"
that lack the presence of biological parents can be entitled to constitutional
protection. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,"" the Supreme Court
found that extended families of uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents
deserved protection from a restrictive city ordinance because "[O]urs is by
no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members
of the nuclear family."'8 9 For a parent's interest in his child to reach a
constitutional dimension, neither marriage nor current residence of the
child and parent together are required: Unwed fathers who live apart
from their children have a constitutional interest in their child if they have
demonstrated a past commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood.90
Furthermore, although the term "family" implies the existence of a bio-
logical relationship, the importance of the familial relationship to the indi-
be rewritten in terms of the other. The Prince Court, for example, might have foreshadowed Yoder by
deciding that the state could not prevent parents who were Jehovah Witnesses from allowing their
children to distribute religious literature because to do so would hinder the parental interest in raising
them in their way of life. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 171 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (divorced parent's decision to remarry);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (housing ordinance
may not make it a crime for a grandmother to live with her grandson); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (during stage of pregnancy prior to end of first trimester, abortion decision and its effectuation
left to woman and her doctor); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 484 (1965) (state law forbidding
use of contraceptives is unconstitutional intrusion upon right of marital privacy); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization of prisoners interferes with basic civil right:
procreation).
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 166; Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
87. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 504. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 844 (1977) (foster family can hold "the same place in the emotional life of the foster child, and
fulfill the same socializing functions, as a natural family" and thus court "cannot dismiss the foster
family as a mere collection of unrelated individuals"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)
(unwed father entitled to hearing on fitness as parent after death of natural mother because law
recognizes "family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony").
90. Compare Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (unwed father who "participated
in the care and support of [his] children" has right to veto adoption of child) with Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (in rejecting unwed father's constitutional claim, Court emphasizes impor-
tance of his failure to take "any significant responsibility" for child).
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vidual involved and to society stems from "emotional attachments" as well
as "the fact of blood relationship."91
These cases suggest that a relevant principle can be derived from the
family law decisions of the Supreme Court. This principle is that parents
of mentally retarded children receiving residential care in a state facility
are entitled to a protected "private realm of family life" if they are emo-
tionally attached to the child and have shared the responsibilities of child
rearing.9 2 Parents who meet these standards and whose mentally retarded
children are receiving residential care are entitled to constitutional protec-
tion for their habilitation choices; in addition, these parents are entitled to
procedural due process if the state attempts to terminate their parental
interests.93
B. The Child's Rights
Of the constitutional rights that belong to children,9 the most critical
one for a mentally retarded child is his liberty interest. 5 A mentally re-
tarded child has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in conditions
91. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. at 844; see Franz
v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (father of children relocated along with mother
pursuant to federal witness protection program has continuing constitutional interest in parent-child
relationship because "what is important is the nature of the bond in question"); Halderman ex rel.
Halderman v. Pennhurst, 707 F.2d 702, 714 (3rd. Cir. 1983) (Rosenn, J. concurring) ("careful judg-
ment by loving and emotionally attached parents" entitled to "substantial weight" in proceeding con-
cerning transfer of voluntarily committed, retarded minor child from state school to community living
arrangement), affld without op., 723 F.2d 897, 723 F.2d 898 (3rd. Cir. 1983); Developments-The
Family, supra note 77, at 1218 ("[P]rotected family relationships are defined not by objective factors
such as formal marriage and blood ties, but rather by the degree to which they provide intimacy,
support, and protection for individual family members.").
92. Cf. Halderman ex rel. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702 (3d Cir.
1983) (plurality opinion) (parents' constitutional right to direct and control upbringing and develop-
ment of their minor children was not afforded sufficient consideration in proceeding in which parents'
voluntarily committed, profoundly retarded minor child was transferred from state school to commu-
nity living arrangement), aff d without op. 723 F. 2d 897, 723 F. 2d 898 (3d. Cir. 1983).
93. See supra note 3.
94. Children possess first amendment rights, see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
212-14 (1975) ("[M]inors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection
. ... "); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (schoolchild's
wearing black armband to school in protest of governmental policy in Vietnam within protection of
first amendment's Free Speech Clause), and fundamental privacy rights, see cases cited supra note 55.
The constitutional rights of children are not, however, coextensive with those of adults. Erznoznik,
422 U.S. at 214 n.11 (Stewart, J., concurring). See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 622, 623 (constitu-
tional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults because: (1) children have "peculiar
vulnerability"; (2) children have "inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner";
(3) "the importance of the parental role in child rearing.").
95. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) ("It is not disputed that a child, in common
with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treat-
ment . . . ."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-31 (1967) (liberty interest of child demands procedural
due process safeguards before confinement in institution for juvenile delinquents).
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of reasonable care and safety, in freedom from restraint, and in such
training as may be required by these interests.9"
The protection of these interests should rest with the child's parents and
not the state. Placing one's child in a state health care facility is not
equivalent to a finding of abuse or neglect, which is necessary to terminate
parental rights and to shift the protection of these interests elsewhere.
97
Such a placement is also not equivalent to a voluntary relinquishment of
parental rights, as is the case when parents put a child up for adoption.9"
While the constitutional rights of children may sometimes conflict with
those of parents, as in a minor's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy,99 in the residential care situation parents and child have the
same interest in seeing that the child gets the best care possible. Habilita-
tion choices are the kind of choices parents traditionally make for their
children, and retarded children should have a right to have their parents,
and not other adults, make them. 00
C. The State's Interests
The state has interests in the family, as well as in the operation of its
institutions, which may impinge upon the rights of children and parents.
Its most important interest in the context of parental habilitation decision-
96. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979) (liberty interest of minor child whose parents sought state-administered mental health care for
him, when added to risk of error in commitment process, prevents parents from having absolute and
unreviewable discretion to decide whether to institutionalize him). The parental right at issue in
Parham is different than the parental right to make habilitation decisions. Parham concerned the
decision to institutionalize a child. A parental habilitation decision does not arise until after the insti-
tutionalization decision has been made and, thus, the state should already have acted to confine use of
its health facilities to cases of genuine need. This Note concerns a mentally retarded child who is
already in residential care, and whose liberty interest against commitment has already been protected.
97. See supra notes 3 and 83.
98. See Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 443 (1983) (when it
appears that parents will not be able to resume custody of their child placed in foster care, parental
rights terminated to free child for adoption).
99. See supra note 55.
100. See L. TRIBE, supra note 75, § 15-21, at 988 ("Once the State, whether acting through its
courts or otherwise, has 'liberated' the child . . . from the shackles of such intermediate groups as
family, what is to defend the individual against the combined tyranny of the State and her own
alienation?"); Goldstein, supra note 65, at 647 ("reciprocal right" of children to have parents make
medical decisions for them). When granted habilitation decisionmaking power, mental health workers
will base these decisions upon their own personal values. See Roth, Some Contingencies of the Moral
Evaluation and Control of Clientele, in HUMAN SERVCE ORGANIZATIONS 499, 500 (Y. Hasenfeid
& R. English eds. 1974):
There is no evidence that professional training succeeds in creating a universalistic moral neu-
trality. On the contrary, we are on much safer ground to assume that those engaged in dis-
pensing professional services (or any other services) will apply the evaluations of social worth
common to their culture and will modify their services with respect to those evaluations unless
discouraged from doing so by the organizational arrangements under which they work
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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making, however, is helping parents care for the health and well-being of
their children.
1. In the Family
Even though parental decisionmaking is often entitled to constitutional
protection, "the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public inter-
est."101 The state's power to regulate the family can derive from either its
police power or parens patriae power.
The police power is the state's inherent power-once it has met proce-
dural safeguards-to promote all aspects of public welfare or public
safety.102 With due process, the state can justify exercising its police
power to control habilitation decisions only if this action would further a
legitimate social goal 03 such as disqualifying unfit parents. This goal is
not met, however, by disqualifying all parents with children in residential
care because all these parents are not unfit to make habilitation deci-
sions.' Thus, this disqualification is overinclusive: It so disadvantages
individual parents as to outweigh the benefit of disqualifying some parents
who are actually unfit.
Under its parens patriae power, the state can advance-in certain cir-
cumstances-the interests of individuals, such as mentally incompetent
adults, who lack the capacity to act in their own best interests." 5 Substan-
101. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
102. See generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) ("According to settled prin-
ciples the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.").
103. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962) (exercise of police power
must advance some aspect of public welfare with statutory means that are "reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.") (quoting Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
104. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("The statist notion that governmental power
should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is
repugnant to American tradition.") (emphasis in original); cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
654-59 (1972) (even if most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents, all are not and
so Illinois law whereby children of these fathers, upon death of mother, are declared dependents
without any hearing violates due process); B. FARBER, MENTAL RErRDATION: ITS SOCIAL CON-
TEXT AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 152 (1968) (families with retarded children exist in all segments
of society).
105. Parens patriae, which means "parent of the country," refers to the "role of state as sovereign
and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLAcF's LAW DICrIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). Its
origins in the English common law derive from the care of material interests of infants by the King's
Chancellor, with the first mention of parens patriae in a case involving a child occurring in 1696.
Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae," 22 S.C.L. Rav. 147, 166
(1970). In the United States, the scope of the parens patriae power has been expanded beyond that
which existed in England. See generally Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972)
(citing series of cases that "establish the right of a State to sue as parens patriae to prevent or repair
harm to its 'quasi-sovereign interests."') Despite this expansion, parens patriae remains as trouble-
some a concept in America as it has been since its origins in England. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16
(1966) ("[I]ts meaning is murky and its historical credentials are of dubious relevance."); cf. Wellesley
v. Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078, 1080-83 (1828) (Lord Redesdale expresses his own doubts about
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tive due process bars the state, however, from exercising a parens patriae
interest to make habilitation decisions for an institutionalized retarded
child; the Constitution entrusts the child's own parents with the protection
of this interest unless they have been disqualified with a judicial finding of
unfitness.""6 Procedural due process requires that the state show parental
unfitness on a case-by-case basis;10 7 unless the state can do so, the child's
own parents protect his best interests. The state's parens patriae interest
here is in helping parents care for the health and well-being of their
child. 08 It can serve this interest by improving the education and medical
treatments given to retarded children"0 " and by making counseling services
available to parents." 0
2. In Its Institutions
The Supreme Court allows states "considerable discretion" in allocating
resources towards the retarded people in state institutions."' This discre-
tion follows from a state's significant interests in confining the use of its
facilities to cases of genuine need," 2 in efficiently distributing the re-
sources it allocates to the treatment of retarded children,"" and in ensur-
grounds on which parens patriae is based, before concluding that it does not really matter because
doctrine really does exist).
106. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (due pro-
cess requires parens patriae legislation be "compatible with the best interests of the affected class"); cf.
Developments-The Family, supra note 77, at 1225-26 (when acting under its parens patriae power
state should advance only interests of child or incompetent person and not attempt to further collective
goals, which can be supported only by use of its police power), and supra note 3.
107. See supra note 3.
108. Cf Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979) (state has parens patriae interest in helping
parents care for mental health of their children).
109. See Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1353-63
(E.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984) (seven goals established in detailed court-
ordered plan for improving state institution for mentally retarded individuals); see also supra text and
accompanying note 16 and infra note 120 (long history of poor treatment accorded mentally retarded
citizens in state facilities).
110. Cf S. PROVENCE & A. NAYLOR, WORKING wITH DISADVANTAGED PARENTS AND THEIR
CHILDREN: SCIENTIFIC AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 4, 8 (1983) (by giving parents guidance, counseling
and developmental evaluations of child, social workers protect and promote development of child
"through a continuing and close association with his parents-a partnership in behalf of the child").
Psychoanalytic research shows that the psychological impact of the birth of a congenitally defective
child can result in a mourning process for the lost child on the part of the mother. Solnit & Stark,
Mourning and the birth of a defective child, 16 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 523
(1961). The mother works through this process more easily when she has "an opportunity to review
her thoughts and feelings about the wished-for child" and "an active role in planning for the child."
Id. at 534.
111. "As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services
for those within its border." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (citations omitted).
When a person is institutionalized and wholly dependent on the state, the state still has "considerable
discretion in determining the nature and scope of its responsibilities." Id. (citations omitted).
112. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604-05 (1979) ("The State obviously has a significant
interest in confining the use of its costly medical facilities to cases of genuine need.").
113. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (state officials must be allowed "diffi-
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ing the security of others institutionalized in that facility.114 A state's dis-
cretion in the employment of its resources when providing social services
has not, however, justified infringement of constitutional rights.'15
Recent Supreme Court decisions have also urged federal courts to show
deference to the decisions of medical professionals and state agencies." 6
Nevertheless, this judicial deference towards professional decisionmaking
in an institutional setting is unwarranted, and even dangerous, when it
allows mental health workers to control habilitation decisions. It ignores
the growing need for external review over narrowly based state bureau-
cracies that now act as substitute parents."' It denies that professional
knowledge is only one of the determinants that impinge upon thinking
about such choices as habilitation decisionmaking: "8 Professionals do not
always know best, and may even face pressures from which parents are
cult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds").
114. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) ("The State. . .has the unquestioned
duty to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the institution [for mentally
retarded persons].").
115. Cf. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (prison officials are accorded latitude in adminis-
tration of prison affairs, but federal courts must "enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,'
including prisoners."); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969) (state has function in maintaining
discipline and administration at state detention facility, but regulations to do so may be invalidated
when they conflict with constitutional rights); see Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1315 (5th Cir.
1974) (state legislature is not free "for budgetary or any other reasons, to provide a social service in a
manner which will result in the denial of individuals' constitutional rights."); Jackson v. Bishop, 404
F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.) ("Humane considerations and constitutional require-
ments are not, in this day, to be measured or limited by dollar considerations . . ").
116. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (in determining what is "reasonable" in
any case presenting claim for training by state, "courts must show deference to the judgment exercised
by a qualified professional" in order to minimize "interference by the federal judiciary with the inter-
nal operations of these institutions"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979) (rather than a formal
hearing or a simple reliance on parents, decision to institutionalize a child for mental health care
requires inquiry by physician at institution); cf Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. School
Dist. Bd. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-08 (1982) (in assuring that requirements of EHCA have
been met, "courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods
upon the States," entrusting child's education to state and local agencies with parents playing an
important role as advocate for child).
In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court deferred to state
autonomy by concluding that because the DDA did not unambiguously require states to provide men-
tally retarded citizens with appropriate treatment in the least restrictive environment, its "bill of
rights" provision was "hortatory, not mandatory." Id. at 24. But see Burt, Constitutional Law and
the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 497 (1984) (DDA "plausibly-I would say most
plausibly-reflected a general congressional endorsement of . . .judicial findings that institutional
conditions violated constitutional rights, a directive that increased use of community facilities has some
important role in correcting these violations, and a commitment of federal funds and executive power
to this corrective purpose.").
117. See Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights Of In, and For Children, LAW & CONTEMP.
N OBS., Summer 1975, at 118, 143 ("[S]ome external review is needed over the narrowly-based state
bureaucracies that now act as substitute-parents in a broadening range of settings.").
118. See J. KArz, supra note 41, at 98 (technical issues are only one factor relevant to medical
choices; for most maladies more than one treatment can lead to favorable result-and chosen interven-
tion may significantly affect patient's subsequent state of well-being); id. at 166 ("[Mledical knowl-
edge is engulfed and infiltrated by uncertainty."); supra note 67.
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free.11 ' Most importantly, the long history of poor treatment that mentally
retarded citizens have received in the United States argues against defer-
ence towards professionals in this area."'
This constitutional analysis suggests that parents have significant inter-
ests in the care and treatment that their institutionalized mentally re-
tarded child receives, and that these interests in many cases may outweigh
the interests of the state. There are, thus, grave infirmities in the way
almost all states deal with habilitation decisionmaking. The states that fall
to involve parents at all"' engage in a "[pirocedure by presumption"
against which the Supreme Court has said the Bill of Rights in general
and the due process clause in particular were designed to protect."' Fur-
thermore, those states that fall to involve parents adequately violate the
substantive, constitutional rights of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children.
IV. ONE STANDARD ARTICULATED
A number of possible approaches to habilitation decisionmaking are
possible under the Constitution. This Note will propose one appropriate
for state statutes.
A. Reliance on Parental Decisionmaking
Rather than selectively involving some parents, states should allow all
parents to become involved, if they want to be, in developing the habilita-
tion plan of their institutionalized child. Doctors, staff members, and the
parents of the child should develop the IHP in careful conversations. As
members of the habilitation team, parents should be encouraged to partici-
119. See, e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 1298, 1299
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (professionals at institutions for mentally retarded persons "are part of a team and
statewide structure" and may feel "desire to comply with budgetary pressures and statewide stan-
dards" which will cause "a yielding of professional judgment to personal career perspectives"); S.
SARANSON & J. DORIS, EDUCATIONAL HANDICAPS, PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL HISTORY 89, 94
(1979) (all institutions for mentally retarded citizens, including community-based centers, are part of
political system "intended to serve the community, not to upset it, and heads of public institutions and
agencies know this well").
120. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 7 (1981) (district court's
findings are undisputed: conditions at Pennsylvania institution for mentally retarded citizens "are not
only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members, but also
inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded"); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 394 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), affd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974) ("inhumane conditions" plague mentally retarded citizens of Alabama); Blatt, The Pariah
Industry, in CHILD ABUSE 185, 197 (L. Gerbner, M. Ross & N. Zigler eds. 1980) (after decade of
attempts to improve care of mentally retarded citizens, finding of "ameliorated abuse"); supra note
16.
121. See supra note 31.
122. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972).
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pate and should be treated with respect.' 23 The doctors and staff members
on the IHP team should make recommendations based on their medical
knowledge, but parents can rely on their own values to make decisions.
The state, as represented by these doctors and staff members, must pre-
sent parents with real choices regarding the nature of the long-term goals
and short-term objectives for their child.
24
The presentation of real choices and a true reliance on parental deci-
sionmaking will be ensured by obliging the institution to obtain parents'
"informed consent" to the IHP that is developed. 15 Before giving their
consent to any plan, parents must be apprised of: (1) the prognosis for the
child; 2 6 (2) the nature of the treatments in the IHP;'2 7 (3) the risks and
benefits of the plan;"2 " and (4) alternatives to the plan.
129
123. See H. BURSZTYN, R. FEINBLOOM, R. HAMM & A. BRODSKY, MEDICAL CHOICES, MEDI-
CAL CHANCES 184 (1981) (doctors sometimes fail to respect human feelings and family prerogatives
by placing pressure on parents when they disagree with their decisions, but "[sihame is a dangerous
drug, with severe side effects and high costs attendant upon its use."); Katz, Disclosure and Consent:
In Search of Their Roots, in GENETICS AND THE LAW II 121, 123 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds.
1980) (recommends new dialogue between doctors and those they treat "in which both, appreciative of
their respective inequalities, make a genuine effort to voice and clarify their uncertainties and then to
arrive at a mutually satisfactory course of action").
124. These choices will not, however, include control over- (1) life or death decisions for the child;
(2) procedures which are not generally accepted medically; (3) emergency situations; (4) routine
health care maintenance. See discussion text accompanying supra notes 39-48.
125. Courts have established a general requirement that physicians inform their patients about
the nature, risks, and alternatives to proposed therapies. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (requirement of reasonable divulgence by
physician of options and risks makes true consent to medical decisionmaking possible); Salgo v. Leland
Stanford, Jr., Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957) (physician
violates duty to patient and opens himself to liability if he withholds any facts necessary for patient to
consent intelligently to treatment).
126. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE, supra note 45, at 74
(inaccurate and incomplete information limits ability to understand effects and significance of
treatments).
127. Requiring doctors to inform their patients of the nature of the medical procedures they are
about to experience is an ancient legal requirement for surgical interventions, which predates "in-
formed consent" by two centuries. See Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (K.B. 1767) ("it is
reasonable that a patient should be told what is about to be done to him that he may take courage and
put himself in such a situation to enable him to undergo the operation," and trespass will lie for
unauthorized surgical procedure); see also supra note 125 (discussing informed consent).
128. The risks of an IHP are all of its possible negative consequences, see Meisel & Kabnick,
supra note 42, at 429 n.85 ("risks" embrace other terms found in common law and statutes, such as
hazards, dangers, side effects, and complications), except for those that are commonly known, remote,
or minor, see, e.g., Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 330, 213 S.E.2d 571, 582 (1975) (com-
monly known and unlikely risks need not be disclosed), or unforeseeable, see, e.g., Holt v. Nelson, 11
Wash. App. 230, 235, 523 P.2d 211, 218-19 (1974) (no duty to disclose unforseeable risks).
Disclosure of "benefits," that is, information with positive connotations, Meisel & Kabnick, supra,
at 436, is needed if patients are to balance the risks of the IHP and to evaluate its overall goals. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54(A) (Page Supp. 1978) (need to inform "what the [medical] proce-
dures are expected to accomplish").
129. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE, supra note 45, at 76
(given a range of acceptable responses to most health conditions, discussions of whether to treat and
how to treat must include "a comparison of several treatment options and an airing of. . . prefer-
ences"); see also supra note 67 (alternatives in health care vary markedly in implications for patient).
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Parental Rights
The administrative costs of such a system are manageable: No more is
required than giving all parents a chance for participation and then re-
quiring their consent to the IHP. In addition, institutional costs will be
unaffected by many of the choices parents will make. For example, par-
ents might choose whether a child with speech problems will be taught
sign language or the use of a language board. And actual disagreements
about IHP's may well be infrequent once parents are involved. One doc-
tor has suggested that the "silent guerilla warfare" between doctors and
their clients will cease once mutual distrust ceases to govern their
relations.13
B. Court Review
If parents refuse to give their consent following an informed appraisal
of the IHP, the institution should be able to appeal the decision to the
state court with jurisdiction over family law matters or to federal district
court."' The initial burden will be on the state to show that the parental
decision is not in the best interests of the child.13 2 If the state cannot do so,
the court will order the institution to implement the parents' wishes. If the
state meets the initial burden of proof, the court should appoint a guard-
ian ad litem for the child for the duration of a hearing.13 3 Following this
hearing, the court should order the IHP that protects the best interests of
the child.
CONCLUSION
This Note has shown that public policy reasons support letting parents
make habilitation decisions for their institutionalized retarded child. De-
nying them this power also infringes their constitutional rights in their
family. States should protect these parental rights by adopting the system
set forth in Part IV of this Note. This system protects the institutionalized
130. J. KATZ, supra note 41, at 103; see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE, supra note 45, at 7-8 (study finds "treatment refusals were usually triggered by too little
information rather than too much").
131. These provisions follow procedures of the EHCA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(2) (1977), discussed
supra note 52.
132. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
105 (1973) ("[T]he child's interests should be the paramount consideration once, but not before, a
child's placement becomes the subject of official controversy.").
133. See de Montigny v. de Montigny, 70 Wis. 2d 131, 141, 23 N.W.2d 463, 468-69 (1975)
("The guardian ad litem is more than an adjunct to the court. He is the attorney for the children and
their interests."); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SoLrr, supra note 65, at 114 (children sometimes
require legal representation that will assure that their interests are paramount).
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child's welfare by involving his parents in the development of his habilita-
tion plan.
-Paul Schwartz
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